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An Antitrust Framework for Climate Change 
By Michael A. Carrier*  
¶1  Climate change is one of the most important issues of the twenty-first century.  
With the Earth’s fate literally hanging in the balance, observers increasingly recognize 
the fragility of the planet’s ecosystem.  Rising temperatures, hurricanes, floods, wildfires, 
droughts, tropical storms, and other events demonstrate the multiple forms in which 
climate change appears to be presenting itself.1 
¶2  As seen with President Obama’s 2009 stimulus package, carbon capture 
technologies, the developing “Smart Grid,” and patent pools addressing climate change 
based on the open source and Creative Commons models, the issues are pressing.  But 
while climate change has received attention from scholars in other fields, including 
environmental, property, international, and human rights law, no one has yet analyzed 
how antitrust law should treat collaborative activity that addresses climate change.  This 
Article addresses this gap.  It focuses on four of the most likely antitrust topics to arise. 
¶3  Part I addresses the issue of markets.  Given the fledgling technologies at issue, 
determining the scope of the relevant market is an uncertain task.  In many cases, it will 
not be clear exactly how broad the market is.  For an example, this Part discusses the 
analysis by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) of Panasonic’s acquisition of Sanyo, 
which combined the two largest manufacturers of a type of portable rechargeable battery. 
¶4  Part II discusses the treatment of monopoly issues, such as refusals to license 
intellectual property (IP) in the United States and European Union.  It then applies this 
law to patents that assist in the removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. 
¶5  Standards are the focus of Part III.  The context in which standards will most likely 
play a role involves the “Smart Grid,” which uses “a two-way flow of electricity and 
information” to create a network that promises to reduce blackouts and to integrate 
renewable energy sources.2  This Part explores how antitrust law should analyze these 
issues. 
¶6  Part IV analyzes patent pools, tracing their benefits in bringing new technologies to 
the market and allowing the combination of various patented inputs.  In particular, this 
Part examines the Eco-Patent Commons and Green Xchange, two voluntary 
arrangements by which patent holders can disseminate beneficial environmental 
technologies. 
 
*Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law-Camden.  Copyright © 2011 Michael A. Carrier.  
I would like to thank Josh Sarnoff for very thoughtful suggestions and Scott Simpkins for excellent 
research assistance.  An earlier version of this Article will appear in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE (Joshua D. Sarnoff ed., forthcoming 2011). 
1 Climate Change: Effects, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., http://climate.nasa.gov/effects/ (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2011). 
2 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE SMART GRID: AN INTRODUCTION, 13 (2008), available at 
http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/DOE_SG_Book_Single_Pages(1).pdf [hereinafter SMART 
GRID]. 
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I.  MARKETS 
¶7  The first issue involves the relevant market.  This issue is crucial in antitrust law.  
Knowing the products to which consumers would turn in the event of a price increase 
will often be dispositive in deciding whether they have suffered harm from the 
challenged conduct.  In fact, other than the small universe of offenses so concerning they 
are automatically deemed illegal, the issue of market power is essential to determining 
the antitrust treatment of the relevant activity. 
¶8  In the context of climate-change technology, market definition is particularly 
challenging.  The products at issue are not established.  It is often not clear which 
technologies are substitutes for each other and, thus, should be included in the same 
market.  Although collaborative activities between rival companies may raise concern, 
the courts and government enforcement agencies should be cautious in finding market 
power in such nascent technologies. 
¶9  One example of how the agencies might approach the issue is presented by the 
2009 acquisition of Sanyo by Panasonic, which has endeavored to become the “No. 1 
Green Innovation Company in the Electronics Industry” by 2018.3  The transaction 
combined the leading manufacturers and sellers of portable nickel-metal hydride (NiMH) 
batteries.4  These batteries are one of three types of rechargeable batteries, which 
consumers cannot easily substitute for each other.5  Portable NiMH batteries play an 
important role in powering two-way radios such as those used by police and fire 
departments. 
¶10  Panasonic and Sanyo were “the only two portable NiMH battery suppliers that 
produce[d] high-quality, reliable products.”6  The acquisition would have allowed the 
combined firm to gain a market share of more than sixty-five percent.7  Nor, given the 
“very limited prospects for growth” in the market, would a potential competitor likely 
have had the incentive to enter.8 
¶11  The FTC imposed a condition on the acquisition that the companies divest a 
portable NiMH battery manufacturing facility in Japan that produced thirty percent of 
such batteries worldwide.9  The divestiture was designed to “preserv[e] competition in 
 
3 PANASONIC CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 2010, at 11 (2010), available at http://panasonic.net/ir/annual/2010/. 
4 FTC Order Sets Conditions for Panasonic’s Acquisition of Sanyo, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Nov. 24, 2009), 
http://ftc.gov/opa/2009/11/sanyo.shtm [hereinafter FTC Order]. 
5 Id.  The other two types are nickel cadmium (NiCd) and lithium-ion (Li-ion). See Analysis of Agreement 
Containing Consent Orders to Aid Public Comment at 2, In re Panasonic Corp. & Sanyo Elec. Co., 2010 
WL 145153 (F,T,C, Nov. 24, 2009) (No. C-4274), available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/0910050/ 
091124panasanyoanal.pdf (noting there are a large number of products “that have a large installed base of 
customers that cannot switch to another type of rechargeable battery because the products were designed 
specifically to accommodate portable NiMH batteries” and highlighting the “strong preference for portable 
NiMH batteries for performance and cost reasons”). 
6 Complaint ¶ 8, In re Panasonic Corp. & Sanyo Elec. Co., 2010 WL 145153 (F.T.C. 2009) (No. C-4274), 
available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/0910050/091124panasanyocmpt.pdf. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. ¶ 9 (explaining that “[e]xisting fringe competitors would have to significantly improve their portable 
NiMH production facilities, improve the quality of their portable NiMH batteries, and overcome customers’ 
unwillingness to rely on a portable NiMH battery supplier that lacks the track record for producing reliable, 
high-quality products”). 
9 FTC Order, supra note 4. 
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the market for these critical batteries.”10  The FTC also required Sanyo to supply a 
subsidiary of Fujitsu with battery sizes not available at the Japan plant, provide access to 
employees needed to run the plant, and transfer IP related to the batteries.11 
¶12  The FTC came to a different conclusion on the competitive effect of the acquisition 
in the hybrid electric vehicle (HEV) battery market.  Even though Panasonic and Sanyo 
were the “most significant suppliers” of NiMH batteries used in current-generation 
HEVs, the FTC recognized that advancements in substitute lithium ion (Li-ion) 
technology made Li-ion HEV batteries a “superior alternative” to NiMH batteries.12  
Several firms already supplied Li-ion HEV batteries to automakers for future HEVs, and 
the FTC concluded that NiMH batteries used in future HEVs would “compete directly 
against Li-ion HEV batteries.”13 
¶13  In the future, numerous other issues might arise in determining the appropriate 
markets in which to evaluate climate change technologies.  Such issues could include:  
(1) the effect of government regulations that limit substitutability between clean 
technology and traditional energy supply solutions, (2) China’s uniquely large 
investments in clean technology (which could affect analysis of market power in the 
United States), and (3) the high fixed costs in sectors such as wind and biofuels.14 
¶14  In any event, issues of market definition presented by climate change technologies 
promise to call for nuanced, fact-specific analysis.  The FTC’s analysis of Panasonic’s 
acquisition of Sanyo, with varying competitive effects in different markets, provides the 
type of careful evaluation that courts and the antitrust enforcement agencies will need to 
apply to market determinations in the context of climate change technology. 
II.  MONOPOLIZATION AND IP REFUSALS TO LICENSE 
¶15  The consequences of market definition will vary in different jurisdictions.  For 
example, the standards for proving monopolization are higher under U.S. than European 
Union (EU) law.  This Part explores one particular issue that likely will arise in the area 
of climate change technologies:  a company’s refusal to license patented technologies.  In 
the United States, a refusal to license will typically not lead to a finding of 
monopolization.  In contrast, the law in the EU is more amenable to punishing firms that 
refuse to share IP with rivals.  This section explores these differences in the context of 
technologies to remove carbon dioxide from the Earth’s atmosphere. 
A. United States Law15 
¶16  Most U.S. courts that have explored the issue have concluded that a company’s 
refusal to license its IP does not constitute monopolization.  This section explores the 






14 Craig Waldman & Margaret Ward, Antitrust Issues in Clean Technology, ANTITRUST SOURCE, at 2–3 
(Apr. 2010), http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/10/04/Apr10-Waldman4-14f.pdf. 
15 Discussion in this section is adapted from MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: 
HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 89–91 (2009). 
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end of the twentieth century.  Of the three, the most IP-friendly decision seems to have 
generated the longest coattails. 
¶17  In the first case, Data General Corp. v. Grumman Systems Support Corp., the court 
held that a party’s “desire to exclude others from use of its [IP protected] work is a 
presumptively valid business justification.”16  The First Circuit found that such a 
presumption was not rebutted when a company refused to license a program diagnosing 
computer problems. 
¶18  In the second case, Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. (Kodak 
II),17 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a monopolization verdict, finding that the Data General 
presumption could be rebutted by evidence of pretext.  The court found that such 
evidence existed where “the proffered business justification played no part in the 
[defendant’s] decision to act” since “Kodak photocopy and micrographics equipment 
require[d] thousands of parts, of which only [sixty-five] were patented,” and Kodak’s 
parts manager testified that patents “did not cross [his] mind” when the company 
instituted its parts policy.18 
¶19  The Federal Circuit provided the final example in In re Independent Service 
Organizations Antitrust Litigation (Xerox), carving out three limited categories in which 
a patentee would not be immune from antitrust liability:  (1) tying patented and 
unpatented products, (2) obtaining a patent through knowing and willful fraud, and (3) 
engaging in sham litigation.19  Because the court concluded that Xerox’s refusal to sell its 
patented parts did not exceed the scope of the patent and did not fall within any of the 
three exceptions, it concluded that Xerox did not violate the antitrust laws.20 
¶20  The Xerox case has been cited by lower courts in support of antitrust immunity for 
refusals to license.  The court in Townshend v. Rockwell International Corp., for 
example, found that “a patent owner has the legal right to refuse to license his or her 
patent on any terms” and, thus, “a predicate condition to a license agreement cannot state 
an antitrust violation.”21 
¶21  The Xerox case also is consistent with a line of cases that grant immunity as long as 
the challenged activity lies within the “scope” of the patent.22  Finally, Xerox is consistent 
with Verizon Communications v. Trinko, in which the Supreme Court not only held that 
an incumbent telephone company’s refusal to share its network with rivals did not 
constitute monopolization but also employed aggressive language that lauded the benefits 
of monopoly power; lamented antitrust law’s “considerable disadvantages,” false 
positives, and negative investment effects; and bemoaned courts’ supervision of decrees 
and “carte blanche” to force monopolists to “alter [their] way of doing business.”23 
 
16 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994). 
17 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). 
18 Id. at 1218–20. 
19 203 F.3d 1322, 1326–28 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
20 Id. 
21 No. C99-0400, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5070, at *26 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2000). 
22 E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 136 (1969); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. 
United States, 309 U.S. 436, 455–56 (1940); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 
U.S. 502, 510 (1917); United States v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 
1981); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1981); SCM Corp. v. Xerox 
Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir. 1981). 
23 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 412, 415 (2004). 
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B. European Union Law 
¶22  Refusals to license IP are more likely to be successfully challenged in the European 
Union.  In Radio Telefis Eireann & Independent Television Publications Ltd. v. 
Commission (Magill), the European Court of Justice found that a refusal to deal 
(regarding copyrighted daily program listings) could constitute an abuse of dominance in 
“exceptional circumstances,” which were met since (1) the information was indispensable 
in creating a comprehensive weekly TV guide, (2) the refusal prevented the appearance 
of a new product, (3) there was no justification for the refusal, and (4) the stations 
“reserved to themselves the secondary market of weekly television guides by excluding 
all competition on that market.”24 
¶23  In another important case, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & 
Co. KG, IMS refused to supply information on sales of drug products in a large number 
of small areas called “bricks.”25  Such a system allowed IMS to offer data without 
identifying sales by individual pharmacies.  After finding that the criteria identified in 
Magill needed to be satisfied, the European Court of Justice found an abuse of 
dominance.26 
¶24  The Court of First Instance in Microsoft v. Commission synthesized these cases, 
stating that exceptional circumstances would be met when a refusal relates to a product 
indispensable to behavior on a neighboring market, excludes effective competition on 
that market, and prevents the appearance of a new product for which there is potential 
consumer demand.27 
¶25  The Court found such circumstances in the Microsoft case since the refusal (1) 
covered indispensable interoperability information, (2) threatened to eliminate 
competition in the market for work group server operating systems, and (3) limited 
technical development.28  The Court’s recitation expanded liability from the Magill and 
IMS cases.  It indicated that it could find liability even in the absence of one of the 
exceptional circumstances.  And it extended the reach of the third factor from preventing 
a new product to limiting technical development.29 
C. Application:  Patented Carbon-Capture Technologies 
¶26  The law on monopolization just described could lead to very different results in the 
United States and EU.  An example of a patented technology possessed by a firm with 
monopoly power could be carbon sequestration, the process of removing carbon dioxide 
from the atmosphere.30  The presence of this chemical compound in the atmosphere 
threatens to play a significant role in climate change. 
 
24 Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, 1995 E.C.R. I-808 ¶¶ 49–50, 53–56. 
25 Case C-418/01, 2004 E.C.R. I-5069 ¶¶ 10–11. 
26 In particular, the Court required proof of the new-product, lack-of-objective-justification, and secondary-
market criteria. Id. ¶¶ 38, 52. 
27 Case T-201/04, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶ 332. 
28 Id. ¶¶ 436, 619–20, 647–49. 
29 Id. ¶¶ 336, 649–58. See generally Renata B. Hesse, Counseling Clients on Refusal to Supply Issues in the 
Wake of the EC Microsoft Case, 22 ANTITRUST 32, 33–34 (2008). 
30 Glossary of Climate Change Acronyms, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/glossary/items/3666.php#C (last visited Aug. 25, 2011). 
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¶27  In 2006, global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide were more than 
thirty-five percent higher than they were before the Industrial Revolution.31  In fact, they 
are higher today than they have been in the last 650,000 years.32  Almost all of this 
increase has been traced to human activities.33  The largest source of carbon dioxide 
emissions across the globe is the combustion of fossil fuels, such as coal, oil, and gas, 
with electricity generation playing the leading role in the United States.34  Because even 
slowing the rate of releasing carbon dioxide into the atmosphere will have only a limited 
effect, technologies that can capture carbon from the atmosphere could be vital in 
addressing climate change.35 
1. Technology 
¶28  One means of carbon sequestration involves “sinks,” or agricultural and forestry 
lands that absorb carbon dioxide.36  For example, trees and plants can remove carbon 
dioxide from the atmosphere and turn it into biomass such as wood and leaves.37  
Sequestration activities “can help prevent global climate change by enhancing carbon 
storage in trees and soils, preserving existing tree and soil carbon, and reducing 
emissions” of carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide.38  The process of carbon 
sequestration has been the subject of numerous patents and patent applications.  This 
Article will discuss four. 
¶29  The first, “fine particle carbon dioxide transformation and sequestration,” applies to 
methods that break down carbon dioxide into small particles, separate out the particles of 
a desired size, and form mineral carbonates.39  This conversion into carbonates promises 
benefits since it can be used for industrial applications, such as building materials.40 
¶30  A second patent, “sequestration of carbon dioxide,” removes carbon dioxide from a 
gaseous stream by converting it to a solid, stable form.41  Such a process passes carbon-
dioxide-enriched air through a gas diffusion membrane to transfer it to a fluid medium; 
passes this fluid through a matrix that accelerates the conversion of carbon dioxide to 
carbonic acid; and adds a mineral ion to the reaction to form a precipitate of carbonate 
 
31 Atmosphere Changes, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/science/ 
recentac.html (last updated Apr. 14, 2011). 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Human-Related Sources and Sinks of Carbon Dioxide, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/co2_human.html (last updated Apr. 14, 2011) [hereinafter 
Human-Related Sources]. 
35 Science of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide, ONLY ZERO CARBON, http://www.onlyzerocarbon.org/co2.html 
(last visited July 13, 2011). 
36 Carbon Sequestration in Agriculture and Forestry, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ 
sequestration/index.html (last updated June 22, 2010) [hereinafter Carbon Sequestration]. 
37 Human-Related Sources, supra note 34. 
38 Carbon Sequestration, supra note 36. 
39 U.S. Patent Application No. 2008/0277319 (filed May 16, 2007).  A carbonate mineral is “any member 
of a family of minerals that contain [a particular] carbonate ion.” Carbonate Mineral, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/95132/carbonate-mineral (last visited Aug. 29, 
2011). 
40 See Patent Application—Fine Particle Carbon Dioxide Transformation and Sequestration, 
PATENTDOCS, http://www.faqs.org/patents/app/20080277319 (last visited Aug. 29, 2011). 
41 U.S. Patent No. 7,132,090 (filed May 2, 2003). 
Vol. 9.8]  Michael A. Carrier 
 519 
salt that can be safely stored for extended periods of time (in the ground or in storage 
sites).42 
¶31  A third, which covers “carbon dioxide capture and related processes,” increases the 
ocean’s alkalinity.43  This enables the water to more easily absorb and store carbon 
dioxide.44  The carbon dioxide can be captured from the atmosphere or from the waste 
stream of a source like a power or chemical plant.45  This method increases the ocean’s 
alkalinity “by electrochemically removing its hydrochloric acid and neutralizing the 
acid through reactions with silicate minerals.”46  As a result, carbon dioxide will dissolve 
into the ocean and “be stored as bicarbonate ion ‘without further acidifying the ocean.’”47 
¶32  A fourth treatment, “scrubbing ‘ionized’ rainstorm tunnel,” involves a method to 
scrub exhaust streams “to approach Zero Emissions with utility in Coal Fired Electricity 
Generation.”48  The invention compresses the Hydrologic Cycle (circulation of Earth’s 
water) by using sunlight, gravity, lightning, and precipitation to cleanse the air within 
various tunnel configurations.  It also uses a pressurized spray and rain that absorbs the 
toxic emissions with water that is “ionized” so it can absorb and dissolve compounds at a 
higher rate.49 
¶33  Given the 2009 Green Technology Pilot Program of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO) to accelerate examination of green technology patent applications, the 
patenting of carbon sequestration technology could very well increase in the near future.  
As PTO Director David Kappos explained, “[e]very day an important green tech 
innovation is hindered from coming to market is another day we harm our planet and 
another day lost in creating green businesses and green jobs.”50  The PTO, thus, is 
implementing a program that accords special status and expedites examination of 
applications for green technologies, which promises to reduce patent pendency by, on 
average, one year.51 
2. Antitrust Analysis 
¶34  If one of these carbon-sequestration technologies proves to be so successful that it 
gives its owner monopoly power, a crucial issue becomes whether the patentee should be 
compelled to license the technology to others.  The answer depends on whether a court 
finds the patentee guilty of monopolization. 
 
42 Id. 




46 Eric Lane, Unpublished, Unpatented, but Not Unimportant: C12 Energy May Use the Ocean to Capture 
CO2, GREEN PATENT BLOG (Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.greenpatentblog.com/2009/03/10/unpublished-
unpatented-but-not-unimportant-c12-energy-may-use-the-ocean-to-capture-co2/. 
47 Id. 
48 U.S. Patent Application No. 2007/081924 (filed Oct. 12, 2005), available at 
http://www.freepatentsonline.com/20070081924.pdf. 
49 Id. 
50 The U.S. Commerce Department’s Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Will Pilot a Program to 
Accelerate the Examination of Certain Green Technology Patent Applications, U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE (Dec. 7, 2009), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2009/09_33.jsp. 
51 Id. 
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¶35  In the United States, a monopolization finding based on a refusal to license is not 
very likely.  As discussed above, the only appellate court (Kodak) that required an IP 
holder to license its protected technology relied on a finding of pretext for which the bar 
is extremely high.  If the company’s refusal to license is completely unrelated to the 
patented component, it could conceivably constitute monopolization.  But in nearly all 
cases, the firm, even with monopoly power, is not compelled to license its IP.  This is 
particularly likely if the company did not initially license the technology and then 
withdraws from the arrangement.52 
¶36  In contrast, a court in the EU is more likely to require a dominant firm to provide 
access to an essential patented carbon-sequestration technology the firm owns.  Under the 
first factor, the patented technology may be indispensable to competing in the market.  
Second, and relatedly, a company excluded from the technology may be unable to 
compete.  Third, the refusal could “limit technical development.”  Before the Microsoft 
decision, this third factor required that the refusal blocked a new product, but the refusal 
now need only limit technical development.53  In short, a dominant firm could be forced 
to share essential patented carbon-sequestration (or other) technologies. 
¶37  If a court (or the European Commission) makes this finding, it is far more likely to 
impose the remedy of compulsory licensing than U.S. courts and agencies.  U.S. courts 
and commentators have emphasized IP owners’ right to exclude in explaining why 
compulsory licensing is not appropriate and could stifle innovation incentives.  For 
example, in Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, the Supreme 
Court explained that sharing contravenes the “purpose of antitrust law” and that the 
opportunity “to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts 
‘business acumen’ in the first place [by] induc[ing] risk taking that produces innovation 
and economic growth.”54  And as a government official explained, “[s]ome of the risks 
being taken by today’s innovators are massive, with reward systems that may be very 
fragile and that could potentially be destroyed by over-aggressive antitrust remedies” like 
compulsory licensing.55 
¶38  In contrast, European courts have been more willing to use the remedy of 
compulsory licensing, focusing less on ex ante incentives for innovation and more on the 
benefits of opening access to markets covered by IP.  To pick just the most prominent 
example, in the Microsoft case, the European Commission (affirmed by the Court of First 
Instance) held that “the possible negative impact of an order to supply on Microsoft’s 
incentives to innovate is outweighed by its positive impact on the level of innovation of 
the whole industry,” with the result that “the need to protect Microsoft’s incentives to 
innovate cannot constitute an objective justification that would offset the exceptional 
circumstances identified.”56  Because of the heightened possibility of the compulsory 
 
52 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (finding monopolization 
when the owner of several downhill skiing facilities withdrew from a joint ticketing arrangement with its 
competitor). 
53 See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶¶ 436, 620, 647–49. 
54 540 U.S. 398, 407–08 (2004). 
55 Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Forcing Firms to Share the 
Sandbox: Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights and Antitrust, Presented at the British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law 10 (May 10, 2004), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/203627.pdf. 
56 Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601 ¶¶ 706–07. 
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licensing remedy, it is far more likely that a court in the EU would require a firm with a 
dominant position to share its patented climate-change technology. 
III.  STANDARD SETTING 
¶39  A third example of an antitrust issue presented by climate change involves standard 
setting.  Standards are common platforms that allow products to work together.  They are 
ubiquitous in our economy and are especially important in network effects markets, in 
which users benefit from an increase in the number of other users in the system.  Even 
though standards are vital, antitrust traditionally viewed the process of setting standards 
with suspicion because, in doing so, industry rivals could discuss sensitive information, 
such as price.57 
¶40  There are several types of standards.  The first, set by governments, tends to 
address product quality, health, and safety.  A second type involves de facto standard 
setting, which occurs when one firm (such as Microsoft, with its Windows operating 
system) dominates the market.  A third type involves standards voluntarily set by private 
industry groups known as standard-setting organizations (SSOs). 
A. Smart Grid 
¶41  One climate-change setting, in which standard setting is likely to play an important 
role, involves the “Smart Grid.”  The Smart Grid integrates twenty-first century 
technology with the twentieth-century electric power infrastructure (the “grid”).58 
¶42  Our nation’s century-old grid is “the largest interconnected machine on Earth,” 
consisting of more than 9,000 electric generating units offering 1,000,000 megawatts of 
generating capacity linked to 300,000 miles of transmission lines.59  The electrification 
made possible by the grid was, according to the National Academy of Engineering, one 
of the most significant engineering achievements of the twentieth century.60 
¶43  Today’s U.S. grid, however, faces increasingly pressing challenges.  In the past 
three decades, growth in peak demand for electricity, which has been driven by 
population expansion, bigger houses and TVs, and more air conditioners and computers, 
has exceeded transmission growth by nearly twenty-five percent each year.61  Because 
utility providers cannot anticipate exactly when or how high demand will peak, they must 
bring online older plants, which generate additional greenhouse gases.62  Although 
transportation has achieved widespread attention for its role in pollution, the generation 
of electricity actually produces twice as much (forty percent as opposed to twenty 
percent) pollution.63  In fact, a five percent increase in the efficiency of the grid “would 
equate to permanently eliminating the fuel and greenhouse gas emissions from 53 million 
 
57 CARRIER, supra note 15, at 323–24. 
58 Plug into the Smart Grid, GEN. ELECTRIC, http://ge.ecomagination.com/smartgrid/#/landing_page (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2011). 
59 SMART GRID, supra note 2, at 5. 
60 Greatest Engineering Achievements of the 20th Century, NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, 
http://www.greatachievements.org (last visited Aug. 29, 2011). 
61 SMART GRID, supra note 2, at 6. 
62 Id. at 14. 
63 Id. at 20. 
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cars.”64  In addition, a lack of awareness of the grid’s performance has led to three 
“massive blackouts” since 1999.65 
¶44  The Smart Grid offers significant potential to address these problems.  
Characterized as “the internet brought to our electric system,” the Smart Grid uses “a 
two-way flow of electricity and information” to create an “automated, widely distributed 
energy delivery network.”66  In particular, it allows information to flow from a 
customer’s meter (1) inside the house to appliances and (2) outside the house to the 
utility.67 
¶45  The Smart Grid can support its components’ generation of power even when a 
utility is not providing it.68  Through “real-time grid response,” the Smart Grid endeavors 
to “reduce the high cost of meeting peak demand.”69  The technology promises (1) to 
save tens of billions of dollars; (2) to “anticipate[], detect[] and respond[] to problems,” 
which reduces widespread blackouts; (3) to “be more resistant to attack and natural 
disasters” and thus facilitate energy independence; and (4) to integrate “[c]lean, 
renewable sources of energy like solar, wind, and geothermal” into the electrical grid.70  
The Smart Grid is a top priority for the U.S. government, which awarded more than $4 
billion and deployed eighteen million smart meters for the grid.71 
B. Interoperability 
¶46  Central to the success of the Smart Grid is interoperability, which is achieved 
through standards.  In the context of the Smart Grid, interoperability can be defined as the 
ability of networks, applicants, or components to securely and effectively exchange and 
use information.72 
¶47  A standard set of interfaces is needed so that components can communicate with 
each other and be incorporated into the Smart Grid.  For that reason, Congress enacted 
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, which charged the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST), an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce, 
“to coordinate the development of a framework that includes protocols and model 
standards for information management to achieve interoperability of smart grid devices 
and systems.”73 
¶48  In January 2010, NIST published Release 1.0 of the standards framework.74  The 
framework stresses the urgency of quick action, as Smart Grid devices such as smart 
 
64 Id. at 7. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 2, 13. 
67 FRED SISSINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34294, ENERGY INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY ACT OF 2007: 
A SUMMARY OF MAJOR PROVISIONS 20 (2007). 
68 SMART GRID, supra note 2, at 23. 
69 Id. at 14. 
70 Id. at 37. 
71 Steven Chu, U.S. Sec’y of Energy, Remarks on the Anniversary of the Recovery Act (Feb. 19, 2010), 
transcript available at http://energy.gov/articles/secretary-chus-remarks-anniversary-recovery-act. 
72 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NIST FRAMEWORK AND ROADMAP FOR 
SMART GRID INTEROPERABILITY STANDARDS, RELEASE 1.0, at 19 (2010) [hereinafter NIST FRAMEWORK]. 
73 Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492, § 1305 (2007) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17385). 
74 See generally NIST FRAMEWORK, supra note 72. 
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meters are moving into large-scale deployment, and the use of sensors providing real-
time system assessments to avert outages is accelerating.75 
¶49  The Report lists areas of priority that include wide-area situational awareness 
allowing the monitoring and display of system components and performance; demand 
response and consumer energy efficiency that lets customers reduce their energy use 
“during times of peak demand or when power reliability is at risk”; energy storage that 
would allow energy to be stored; and electric transportation that would “enabl[e] large-
scale integration of plug-in electric vehicles.”76 
¶50  In contrast, if the industry does not adopt standards, it would be taking the risk that 
Smart Grid technologies, in which companies are increasingly investing, will become 
obsolete or be implemented with insufficient security.77  The absence of standards also 
could hinder innovation, beneficial applications, and the enablement of economies of 
scale and scope allowing robust price and quality competition.78 
¶51  In bringing together the relevant stakeholders, the NIST has relied on the GridWise 
Architecture Council, a team composed of utility providers, technology firms, and 
academic leaders developing standards to promote interoperability among components 
interacting with the Smart Grid.79  In addition, due to the hundreds of standards required 
for the Smart Grid, NIST is working with many private SSOs.80  But even though the 
EISA required the creation of standards for the Smart Grid, it did not make them 
mandatory or give the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission the authority to enforce 
the standards.81 
C. Antitrust Analysis 
¶52  Courts and the antitrust agencies should find that standard setting in the Smart Grid 
context does not violate the antitrust laws.  Under the “Rule of Reason,” these activities 
have not yet demonstrated any significant anticompetitive effects, but instead have shown 
substantial procompetitive justifications.82 
¶53  Standard setting could potentially increase prices, lead to boycotts of rivals, or 
foster collusion in markets for goods sold to consumers.  To date, however, these 
concerns have not appeared in the context of the Smart Grid.  One reason could be traced 
to the guiding principles NIST uses for evaluating standards.  The principles support 
“collaborative, consensus-driven processes” for developing standards and require SSOs 
 
75 Id. at 13–14. 
76 Id. at 20–21. 
77 Id. at 14. 
78 Id. 
79 Mission and Structure, GRIDWISE ARCHITECTURE COUNCIL, 
http://www.gridwiseac.org/about/mission.aspx, (last updated Aug. 2011). 
80 NIST FRAMEWORK, supra note 72, at 15, 20, 45–46. 
81 Smart Grid Policy, Policy Statement, 128 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,060, at ¶ 23 (July 16, 2009), available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2009/071609/E-3.pdf. 
82 Antitrust courts consider most conduct (with the exception of the most concerning activities, such as 
price fixing) under the Rule-of-Reason framework, which considers factors such as (1) anticompetitive 
effects, (2) procompetitive justifications, and (3) reasonable necessity or less-restrictive alternatives for the 
restraint. See generally Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU 
L. REV. 1265.  
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to be “open to participation by all relevant and materially affected parties.”83  Such a 
requirement reduces the likelihood of exclusionary conduct that would injure rivals.  In 
particular, it makes it less likely that parties with market power would enter into a 
concerted refusal to deal with competitors. 
¶54  The NIST also addresses concerns relating to the potential exercise of market 
power by requiring standards to be available on “fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory” 
terms.84  Such a requirement is consistent with licensing rules that many SSOs have 
adopted.  In particular, it addresses the possibility of “holdup,” by which a patentee 
lacking market power before the selection of the standard imposes excessive licensing 
terms after its technology is incorporated into the standard and the industry has invested 
in the technology.  Such licensing rules offer a procompetitive justification by 
circumventing a potential bottleneck and contributing to the creation of a product that 
might not otherwise exist. 
¶55  In its Technology Transfer Guidelines, the European Commission recognizes the 
benefits of SSO members negotiating licensing terms, stating that parties are “free to 
negotiate and fix royalties for the technology package and each technology’s share of the 
royalties either before or after the standard is set.”85  It explains that such agreement “is 
inherent in the establishment of the standard” and cannot by itself be viewed as 
“restrictive of competition.”86  And it highlights the efficiencies from royalty agreements 
before standards are adopted, which avoid standards that result in market power.87 
¶56  In addition to a lack of anticompetitive effects, Smart Grid standard setting 
promises significant procompetitive justifications.  Most important, it fosters the 
interoperability essential to the operation of the Smart Grid.  Just to pick one example, if 
today’s cars and light trucks charged during off-peak times, seventy percent of their 
needs could be supplied by the idle capacity of today’s electric power grid.88 
¶57  Absent a standardized Smart Grid, alternative energy sources and new smart 
consumer devices would not be able to effectively attach to the grid and communicate 
with each other.  The lack of standards would lead to Smart Grid components becoming 
obsolete or suffering from security breaches.  The NIST report listed numerous examples 
of technologies for which the current standards are not adequate for future deployment89 
and other examples where there are multiple competing standards.90 
¶58  In short, standard setting in the Smart Grid context does not currently appear to 
result in significant anticompetitive effects.  While this deserves continued attention, the 
potential procompetitive justifications are compelling.  The Smart Grid promises to 
 
83 NIST FRAMEWORK, supra note 72, at 45. 
84 Id. at 45–48. 
85 Commission Notice, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Technology 
Transfer Agreements, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 2, ¶ 225 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu 
/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:101:0002:0042:EN:PDF [hereinafter TT Guidelines]. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 NIST FRAMEWORK, supra note 72, at 25. 
89 Id. at 95–96, 100–01, 103–04 (referencing plug-in electric vehicles, energy storage, and the Grid’s 
communication protocol). 
90 Id. at 78–79, 90–91, 97–98 (discussing smart home appliances, meter usage data, and time 
synchronization). 
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reduce debilitating blackouts, to be more resistant to disasters, and to integrate renewable 
energy sources.  It will foster interoperability, which will enhance security and make it 
less likely that consumers will be stranded with obsolete technologies.  It will also enable 
more efficient use of electric generation assets, which will lead to a reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
¶59  Given that the Smart Grid promises to be a revolutionary technology for the 
twenty-first century, these justifications should carry the day.  Courts and agencies should 
apply Rule-of-Reason analysis to the activity and uphold nearly all standard-setting 
activity that would foster Smart Grid interoperability. 
IV.  PATENT POOLS 
¶60  Patent pools offer the fourth example of an antitrust issue presented by climate 
change.  A patent pool involves a single organization—either a new entity or one of the 
original patent holders—that licenses the patents of two or more companies to third 
parties as a package.91 
A. Background 
¶61  As the antitrust enforcement agencies have recognized, patent pools tend to be 
procompetitive in “integrating complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, 
clearing blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation.”92  For that 
reason, the agencies have upheld pools related to (1) MPEG-2, a video compression 
technology underlying the transmission, storage, and display of digitized moving images 
and sound tracks;93 (2) DVD-ROM and DVD-video formats describing “the physical and 
technical parameters for DVDs for read-only-memory and video applications”;94 and (3) 
third generation (3G) wireless communication systems.95 
¶62  These pools were composed of essential patents, which means that the product or 
standard at issue in the pool could not have been produced without infringing the patent.  
Essential patents do not have substitutes and typically are complementary, possessing a 
greater value if the licensee can use other essential patents. 
¶63  On the other hand, patent pools can present anticompetitive harm when they 
facilitate the combination of substitute patents, which are not necessary for the use of a 
technology in the pool and which present alternate ways of creating products that 
otherwise would be used in competition with each other.  For example, competing patents 
made up the Summit-VISX pool, which consisted of lasers used in photorefractive 
 
91 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 132 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001). 
92 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 5.5 (1995) [hereinafter IP GUIDELINES]. 
93 Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., to Gerrard R. 
Beeney (June 26, 1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf [hereinafter 
MPEG-2 pool letter]. 
94 Letter from Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., to Gerrard R. Beeney 
(Dec. 16, 1998), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/2121.pdf. 
95 Letter from Charles A. James, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div., to Ky P. Ewing 
(Nov. 12, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/200455.pdf. 
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keratectomy (PRK), a form of eye surgery employed to correct vision disorders.  In its 
Complaint, the FTC explained that, if not for the pool, the two firms would have 
competed against each other “by using their respective patents, licensing them, or 
both.”96  These substitute patents were not necessary for the use of a technology in the 
pool, but presented alternate ways of creating products that otherwise would have 
competed with each other. 
¶64  Patent pools also could reduce innovation.  One context in which this has arisen 
involves grantback clauses.  Grantbacks are arrangements by which a licensee agrees to 
extend to the IP licensor the right to use the licensee’s improvements to the licensed 
technology.97  The concern is that grantbacks could reduce innovation incentives by 
reducing the return from follow-on inventions.98  This concern has been addressed 
through requirements that grantback clauses be limited as narrowly as possible (such as 
to essential, not substitute, patents).99 
¶65  The distinction between essential and substitute patents parallels that in the 
European Union.  The European Commission, in its Guidelines on the application of 
Article 81 (now Article 101) of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements, 
explained that “[t]he inclusion in the pool of substitute technologies restricts inter-
technology competition,” that pools “substantially composed of substitute technologies 
. . . amount[] to price fixing between competitors,” and that “[w]hen a pool is composed 
only of technologies that are essential and therefore by necessity also complements,” it 
does not violate Article 81.100  Japan’s Fair Trade Commission, in its Guidelines on 
Standardization and Patent Pool Arrangements, echoed this distinction, noting that 
“competition among the patented technologies is not restricted when only the essential 
patents are pooled” but that the pooling of nonessential patents “is likely to restrict 
competition and represent a legal problem.”101 
B. Eco-Commons Patent Pool 
¶66  One promising example of a patent pool in the climate change setting involves the 
“Eco-Patent Commons,” by which companies have agreed to license (on a royalty-free 
basis) patents that offer environmental benefits.  The arrangement, which began in 
January 2008, is based on the open source movement, which employs licenses that allow 
others to use the software but require that they maintain its open character. 
¶67  The Eco-Patent Commons is open to all.  At the time this Article went to press, 
twelve companies—Bosch, Dow, DuPont, Fuji-Xerox, HP, IBM, Nokia, Pitney Bowes, 
 
96 Complaint ¶ 8, Summit Tech., Inc., 127 F.T.C. 208 (1999), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/03/summit.cmp.htm. 
97 IP GUIDELINES, supra note 92, § 5.6. 
98 Hartmut Schneider, Analyzing Patent Pools: Will They Pass Muster Abroad?, LAW360 (Aug. 16, 2010), 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/aabbc202-8474-4696-a2a5-61f6aa00c7ef/Presentation/ 
PublicationAttachment/20796e4a-1c63-4c50-b4ea-65665acf7846/Analyzing%20Patent_Pools.pdf. 
99 MPEG-2 pool letter, supra note 93, at 13 (restriction of grantback clauses to essential patents makes it 
“unlikely that there is any significant innovation left to be done that the grantback could discourage”). 
100 TT Guidelines, supra note 85, ¶¶ 219, 220. 
101 JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMM’N, GUIDELINES ON STANDARDIZATION AND PATENT POOL ARRANGEMENTS, 
pt. 3, at 6–7 (2005), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_guidelines/ama/pdf/Patent_Pool.pdf. 
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Ricoh, Sony, Taisei and Xerox—had licensed more than 100 patents to the public 
domain.102 
¶68  Businesses may pledge patents that offer an environmental benefit, which “directly 
or indirectly improve[s] or protect[s] the environment and ecology of our planet.”103  
Patents may cover not only innovations related to environmental solutions but also 
manufacturing or business process innovations that provide benefits such as pollution 
prevention or efficient energy use.104  The patents are listed on a website hosted by the 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development.105 
¶69  Companies also can retain their rights to patents that afford a “significant business 
advantage.”106  But for other patents, members have been willing to share the patents to 
“provide greater value in a public commons.”107 
¶70  Examples of patents that have been pledged to the Eco-Patent Commons include 
! HP’s “self-contained battery recycling station that [] encourage[s] 
consumers to exchange their used batteries for new ones or for credit.”108 
! Fuji Xerox’s patents that effectively treat wastewater and “reduce 
quantities of the coagulant and the resultant sludge without harming the 
environment.”109 
! Xerox’s patents that “cut[] the time it takes to remove toxic waste from 
soil and water from years to months” and that “make[] magnetic 
refrigeration less harmful to the environment” by “eliminat[ing] the need 
for ozone depleting refrigerants and energy-consuming compressors.”110 
! Ricoh’s patent that “reduces waste of image device cartridges” used in 
copy machines, printers, and fax machines.111 
 
102 Eco-Patent Commons, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.wbcsd.org/ 
templates/TemplateWBCSD5/layout.asp?type=p&MenuId=MTQ3NQ&doOpen=1&ClickMenu=LeftMenu 
(last visited Aug. 29, 2011). 
103 Q&A, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/ 
TemplateWBCSD5/layout.asp?type=p&MenuId=MTU2Mg&doOpen=1&ClickMenu=LeftMenu (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2011). 
104 Eco-Patent Commons to Receive Three Patents from HP, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. (July 1, 2010), http://www.wbcsd.org/Plugins/DocSearch/details.asp?DocTypeId=251&ObjectId= 
Mzg1MDM&URLBack=/templates/TemplateWBCSD2/layout.asp%3Ftype%3Dp%26MenuId%3DMzcx%
26doOpen%3D1%26ClickMenu%3DRightMenu [hereinafter Patents from HP]. 
105 Overview, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.wbcsd.org/templates/ 
TemplateWBCSD5/layout.asp?ClickMenu=special&type=p&MenuId=MTU1OQ (last visited Aug. 29, 
2011).  “The WBCSD is a CEO-led, global association” of 200 companies whose mission is “to provide 
business leadership as a catalyst for change toward sustainable development and to support the business 
license to operate, innovate and grow in a world increasingly shaped by sustainable development issues.” 
Q&A, supra note 103. 
106 Q&A, supra note 103. 
107 Overview, supra note 105. 
108 Patents from HP, supra note 104. 
109 Dow and Fuji Xerox Join Eco-Patents Commons, Xerox Pledges Additional Patent to Help the Planet, 
WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Oct. 20, 2009), http://www.wbcsd.org/Plugins/ 
DocSearch/details.asp?DocTypeId=33&ObjectId=MzYxMTQ. 
110 Id. 
111 Ricoh and Taisei Join Eco-Patent Commons, DuPont Contributes Additional Eco-Friendly Patents, 
WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Mar. 23, 2009), 
http://www.wbcsd.org/Plugins/DocSearch/details.asp?DocTypeId=251&ObjectId=MzM3ODM. 
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! Taisei’s patent that “provides an environmentally friendly green space 
construction method solution to improve water quality.”112 
! DuPont’s patents that “provide environmentally superior refrigerants for 
use in refrigeration and air conditioning” by “reduc[ing] or eliminat[ing] 
the potential for ozone depletion and global warming.”113 
C. Green Xchange 
¶71  A second project, the Green Xchange,114 launched in 2010 in cooperation with 
Creative Commons.  Creative Commons is a nonprofit organization that has developed 
model licenses that allow creators to retain some—though less than all—copyright 
rights.115 
¶72  Green Xchange is more restrictive than the Eco-Patent Commons.  Firms that 
contribute patents to Green Xchange can charge users a fixed annual licensing fee and 
restrict licensing by rivals for competitive use.116  The patentees “determine the terms for 
use” and “can protect sensitive information.”117  Such restrictions allow companies to 
license technology that could have a positive environmental impact in unrelated 
industries, while protecting them from ceding a competitive advantage to their rivals. 
¶73  Green Xchange’s founders have claimed that this platform will produce more 
inventions since it does not “depend on altruism.”118  Companies in different fields could 
benefit from research without threatening the patentee’s core business.119  For example, 
Nike’s research on “maximizing the efficiency of air pressure in sneaker design” could be 
used by a company that manufactures truck tires in a way that “saves materials and 
money, creates a more eco-friendly product, and does not harm Nike’s sales.”120  In fact, 
after Nike shared its adhesive technology with footwear makers, the levels of harmful 
solvents used by its suppliers fell from, on average, 350 grams per pair of shoes in 1997 
to less than 15 grams in 2009.121 
¶74  In addition to benefiting the environment, Green Xchange could foster the 
development of communities that “collaborate in innovation and the exchange of 
ideas.”122  Such an arrangement would be similar to open-source software licensing in 
copyright, where the free sharing of knowledge often provides “a fertile ground for new 




114 THE GREEN XCHANGE, http://greenxchange.force.com/vGXhome (last visited Aug. 29, 2011). 
115 About, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://creativecommons.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2011). 
116 Mary Tripsas, Everybody in the Pool of Green Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at BU5, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/01/business/01proto.html?_r=1. 
117 Agnes Mazur, Green Xchange: Creating a Meta-Map of Sustainability, WORLD CHANGING (May 5, 
2009), http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/009822.html. 
118 Tripsas, supra note 116 (quoting Green Xchange coordinator and VP for science at Creative Commons). 
119 Mazur, supra note 117. 
120 Id. 
121 Tripsas, supra note 116. 
122 Id. 
123 Overview, supra note 105. 
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engine, and collaboration platforms would facilitate the identification of companies with 
common interests.124 
¶75  In short, Green Xchange “challenges companies” to view patents not “as something 
to be guarded and protected” but “as something transferable, and potentially profitable 
when shared.”125 
D. Antitrust Analysis 
¶76  Courts and the antitrust agencies should find that the Eco-Patent Commons and 
Green Xchange patent pools do not present antitrust violations. 
1. Anticompetitive Effects 
¶77  First, the pools do not create significant anticompetitive effects.  They appear to 
consist of complementary—not substitute—patents.  Accordingly, they promise to 
increase output and make patents more widely accessible than they otherwise would be.  
Pools can be particularly useful in the climate change arena, which “often integrate[s] 
multiple technologies.”126  To be sure, the pools are not as formally complementary as 
others, since they do not cover a single product that requires use of all of the patents.  
Instead, the patents cover multiple products.  Nonetheless, the pools promise to increase, 
not reduce, output. 
¶78  Second, the Eco-Patent Commons does not present any notable threats of 
exclusion.  Any company is free to join the pool.  And even firms that do not join are able 
to use the patents that have been pledged to the pool. 
¶79  There is modestly more antitrust concern with Green Xchange, since firms might 
not be able to use a competitor’s patents.  Members can restrictively license their patents 
and protect sensitive information.  As the agencies’ IP Licensing Guidelines explain, 
however, exclusion “is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects unless (1) excluded firms 
cannot effectively compete in the relevant market for the good incorporating the licensed 
technologies and (2) the pool participants collectively possess market power in the 
relevant market.”127  Here, these characteristics do not seem to be present since, at a 
minimum, it appears that excluded firms can compete in the market. 
¶80  Third, no coercion is involved in selecting patents in the pool.  A company is free 
to use only those patents that it needs.  It is not forced to accept packages of patents that 
include some that it might not desire. 
¶81  Fourth, there do not appear to be anticompetitive price or output restraints.  The 
Guidelines explain that “the joint marketing of pooled intellectual property rights with 
collective price setting or coordinated output restrictions” could be “deemed unlawful if 
 
124 Tripsas, supra note 116. 
125 Mazur, supra note 117. 
126 Mark Sajewycz, Patenting Clean Technologies: Trends, Issues, and Strategies, NORTON ROSE (Jan. 21, 
2010), http://www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/45553/patenting-clean-technologies-trends-
issues-and-strategies; see also Sarah Dowdey, What Is Clean Coal Technology?, HOWSTUFFWORKS, 
http://science.howstuffworks.com/environmental/green-science/clean-coal.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2011) 
(explaining how clean coal technology “us[es] multiple technologies to clean coal and contain its 
emissions”). 
127 IP GUIDELINES, supra note 92, § 5.5. 
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they do not contribute to an efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity among 
the participants.”128  Here, users of the Green Xchange pool are charged a fixed annual 
licensing fee.  Such fees could raise concern, such as where (as in the case of the DIVX 
pool) patentees combine substitute patents and charge sublicensees a fee each time they 
use a patent from the pool.129  In the Green Xchange pool, however, the annual fee seems 
to be a means to recover the costs of creating patented inputs and is essential to an 
“integration of economic activity.”130 
2. Procompetitive Justifications 
¶82  In addition to a lack of anticompetitive effects, the pools offer procompetitive 
justifications.  First, they increase access to environmental patents.  By offering the 
patents for free (in the Eco-Patent Commons) or for a fixed amount (Green Xchange), the 
pools enhance output in a vital industry.  The pools also foster cross-pollination of ideas 
and environmentally friendly products across various industries. 
¶83  Second, the pools increase innovation by opening the market to new players and 
allowing businesses “to identify common areas of interest and establish new collaborative 
development efforts.”131  The companies can collaborate on research aimed at common 
goals such as reducing environmental harms.132  More broadly, the pools promise to 
“chang[e] the way we think about transferring intellectual property and benefiting from 
shared ideas.”133  The sharing of IP-protected assets serves as an example of a regime 
that—like open-source and Creative-Commons licensing—could be successful without 
employing a maximalist view of IP rights. 
¶84  Third, the pools avoid litigation.  Firms can use the patents without having to spend 
time litigating their validity in court.  Confirming the lack of concern is that many of the 
members of the pools are not competitors. 
¶85  In short, pools such as the Eco-Patent Commons and Green Xchange do not have 
significant anticompetitive effects.  At the same time, they promise to promote 
collaboration and innovation.  Given the vitally important endeavor in which these pools 
are engaged, they should not be subject to significant antitrust scrutiny. 
¶86  Even the European Union, which often applies a more aggressive antitrust 
approach, would likely find that the pools do not present a competition problem.  Under 
EU law, a pool with a dominant position must adhere to fair and nondiscriminatory 
(FRAND) royalties and issue nonexclusive licenses.134  These requirements “are 
necessary to ensure that the pool is open and does not lead to foreclosure and other anti-
competitive effects on down stream markets.”135 
¶87  The Eco-Patent Commons and Green Xchange pools have issued nonexclusive 
licenses, and there has been no concern that parties obtaining licenses from the pool have 
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not been able to use other technologies.  In addition, any royalties seem to be fair and 
nondiscriminatory.  The Eco-Patent Commons allows its patents to be used for free.  And 
Green Xchange imposes a fixed annual licensing fee that appears to be a reasonable 
means to recover costs. 
3. Licensing Analysis 
¶88  Finally, the deference to licensing in the pool context should apply to such activity 
on a smaller scale.  Not all licensing issues will involve the pools discussed here.  But 
many of the same benefits will justify licensing arrangements between fewer parties. 
¶89  As the U.S. agency guidelines explain, “[i]ntellectual property typically is one 
component among many in a production process” which “derives value from its 
combination with complementary factors [such as] manufacturing and distribution 
facilities, workforces, and other items of intellectual property.”136  It is usually more 
efficient for the patentee to enter into licensing agreements with parties that own 
complementary assets or capabilities.137  In particular, licensing “can facilitate integration 
of the licensed property with complementary factors of production,” which can result in 
efficient exploitation of IP, thereby leading to lower costs, increased research and 
development (R&D), and new products.138 
¶90  To similar effect, the European Commission has recognized that “the vast majority 
of licen[s]e agreements are pro-competitive” as they disseminate technologies, increase 
efficiency, and foster innovation by allowing companies to receive returns covering R&D 
costs.139 
¶91  A patentee can utilize a broad range of licenses, which include customer, territorial, 
and field-of-use restrictions and various types of royalties.  Field-of-use and geographic 
restrictions allow patentees to offer rights that complement the strengths of licensees.140  
The restrictions also prevent free-riding and increase incentives to license.141 
¶92  For all these reasons, the licensing of climate-change technologies between a few 
parties is likely to be procompetitive.  For example, a party that licenses patented carbon 
sequestration technologies will tend to expand output and the number of parties that 
benefit from the technology. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶93  Technologies to combat climate change present numerous uncharted issues that call 
for nuanced antitrust analysis.  This Article has provided an overview, recognizing the 
complicated issues that are likely to arise from market definition, patented carbon-
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sequestration technologies, Smart Grid standard setting, and patent pools such as the Eco-
Patent Commons and Green Xchange. 
¶94  First, the issue of market definition calls for fact-specific analysis.  The FTC’s 
review of Panasonic’s acquisition of Sanyo provides a roadmap for the type of nuanced 
evaluation required. 
¶95  Second, a party’s control of patented carbon-capture technologies would lead to 
different outcomes depending on the jurisdiction.  The United States most likely would 
not require a monopolist to license the patents.  In contrast, the EU would be more 
willing to require a firm with a dominant position to share its patented climate-change 
technology. 
¶96  Third, standard-setting activity related to the Smart Grid is likely to avoid antitrust 
liability.  The interoperability allowing energy grid network components to communicate 
with each other presents strong procompetitive justifications without apparent 
countervailing anticompetitive effects. 
¶97  Fourth, patent pools are likely to survive antitrust scrutiny.  The Eco-Patent 
Commons and Green Xchange, which do not exclude any firms and do not require 
package licensing of patents, present minimal anticompetitive effects.  At the same time, 
the pools offer procompetitive justifications in increasing access to environmental patents 
and fostering innovation. 
¶98  In short, while the field of climate change technology requires continued scrutiny, 
most of the collaboration that has occurred to date should be shielded from antitrust 
condemnation. 
